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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4l 03(2)(h) in that this is an appeal from a domestic relations case regarding divorce.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1. Father's Income:
a. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to base the father's
income on his paystubs and tax returns?
1.

Standard of Review: "[This Court] review[s] the district court's

factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for
correctness, affording the court some discretion in applying the law
to the facts."' Arnold v. Arnold, 177 P.3d 89 (Ut. App. 2008).
(internal quotation omitted).This Court will reverse only if "(I) there
was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the evidence clearly
preponderated against the finding; or (3) such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Rayner v.
Rayner, 316 P. 3d 455 (Ut. App. 2013, 14 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
2. Alimony:
a. Did the court err in concluding as a matter of law that father's Alimony
obligation should be $1,900.00 per month, even if the father's income
should be imputed at $6,662.00 gross per month, when combined with the

award to the mother of child support, resulted in an award to the mother
which was hundreds of dollars in excess of the mother's stated monthly
needs, as determined by the trial court?
i. Standard of Review: "We will review the trial court's decisions

regarding child support and alimony under the abuse of discretion
standard." See Jenson v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Ut. App. 1995)
(applying the abuse of discretion standard of review for child
support determinations); Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1211
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of
review for alimony determinations). See Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d

754, 757.
ii. \Ve review a district court's alimony determination for an abuse of

discretion and II will not disturb [its] ruling on alimony as long as the
court exercises its discretion within the bounds and under the
standards we have set and has supported its decision with adequate
findings and conclusions. 11 Connell v. Connell, 836 P. 3d 233 (Ut.
App. 2010), iI 5, (internal quotation marks omitted).
111.

[ill 14] In Bakanowski, the court of appeals explained that if a district
court considers each of the statutory alimony factors, "we will not
disturb its award absent a showing that such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Bakanowski v.
Bakanowski, 80 P .3d 153 (Ut. App. 2003 ), iJ 10, (emphasis added)
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(internal quotation marks omitted).
1v. We will uphold a trial court's alimony determination on appeal

"unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated."

Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Ut. App. 1995).
b. Did the Court err in finding the order of alimony must include expenses for
the mother that she was not actually incurring and had never incurred?
i. "We will review the trial court's decisions regarding child support

and alimony under the abuse of discretion standard." See Jenson v.

Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Ut. App. 1995) (applying the abuse of
discretion standard of review for child support determinations);
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

(applying the abuse of discretion standard of review for alimony
determinations). See Andnts v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 754, 757.
c. If the court's ruling regarding imputation to the father of a monthly income
of $6,662.00 was in error, was the resulting award of alimony to the mother
an abuse of discretion?
1.

Standard of Review: "We will review the trial court's decisions
regarding child support and alimony under the abuse of discretion
standard." See Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of review for
child support determinations); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,
1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (applying the abuse of discretion
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standard of review for alimony detenninations). See Andrus v.
Andrus, 169 P.3d 754, 757.
3. Child Support:
a. Did the Court err in calculating the father's child support obligation based
upon his imputed income of $6,662.00 per month?
1.

Standard of Review: "As for the modified child support, [this

Court] will not upset the trial court's apportionment of financial
responsibilities in the absence of manifest injustice or inequity that
indicates a clear abuse of discretion." Doyle v. Doyle, 221 PJd 888
(Ut. App. 2009) (internal quotation omitted) (App. to Supreme Court
on other Grounds).
11.

A trial court's decision regarding child support will not be disturbed
absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of
... discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, l 056 (Utah App.
(1987) cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).

4. Attorney Fees 1:
a. Did the trial court err in awarding the mother's attorney fees 2?

Mother was awarded attorney fees under: 1) Utah Code 30-3-3 and 2) Utah Code 78B-5825.
1

Father states that the standard of review for an award of Attorney fee's is for err.
However, Mother was awarded attorney feeds under Utah Code 30-3-3 which is held at a
standard of review of abuse of discretion. Further, Mother was awarded fees under Utah
Code 78B-5-825 which is held at a standard of review of correctness.

2

4

1.

Because the trial court exercises broad discretion regarding requests
for attorneys' fees, this Court "presume the correctness of the [trial]
court's decision absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of ... discretion." Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (Ut. App.
200 I) (internal quotations omitted).

11.

'"Whether the trial court properly interpreted the legal prerequisites
for awarding attorney fees under section [788-5-825] is a 'question
of law' that we 'review ... for correctness."' Still Standing Stable,
LLC v. Allen, 122 P. 3d 556 (Ut. 2005), ~ 8, (quoting Rushton v. Salt
Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ~ 17, 977 P.2d 120 I (holding that
statutory interpretation presents a legal question)).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from father's February 28, 2011, filing of a Petition to Modify
his child support and alimony obligations, alleging a substantial change of circumstance
had arisen since the parties' Decree of Divorce, which was entered on September 5, 2008.
Mother filed an Answer on March 25, 2011. Father failed to prosecute his Petition until
he requested a final pre-trial on November 25, 2013-over two and a half years later.
Mother, not having heard about anything on the case, assumed the case had been
dismissed. Mother hired an attorney and asked the court to not set the case for trial as
Father had failed to provide any of his initial disclosures as required by Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Father did not file his initial disclosures until May 2014,
even though Mother had requested them repeatedly. Father's financial disclosures were

5

dismal at best 3• The parties litigated the matter and went to trial on October 22, 2015, in
front of the Honorable Judge Samuel McVey.
Father sought from the trial court a reduction of his child support, a reduction of
his alimony and for the court to issue any award of support mmc pro tune to before the
Divorce Decree was entered by the District Court.
The trial court heard testimony, took argument and received evidence. After trial,
the court took the matter under advisement and made written findings on November I0,
2015. The trial court found Father to not be credible. The court imputed income to
Father finding that he as the ability to earn at least $6,662.00 per month. The trial court
found that Father had the ability to pay alimony and that Mother had a need and thus,
awarded Mother $1,900 in alimony. The trial court ordered alimony to continue for the
length of the marriage or 19 years.
The evidence and testimony provided to the trial court was sufficient for the court
to enter its stated findings. This Court should find that there was not an abuse of
discretion and that the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law along with
the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce should be upheld. Mother should be awarded
her attorney fees on appeal.

Father provided a partial ( un-signed) copy of his personal 2011, 2012 and 2013 taxes
and his personal paychecks (which were written by his wife out of the business account).
Father failed to provide any documentation of the business, including QuickBooks files,
tax returns, expense ledgers, bank account information, etc. Father did not provide any
proof of personal bank accounts (claiming he did not have one) and/or any proof of his
debts.

3
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Appellee supplements and/or disputes AppellanCs statement of facts as follows:
Procedural Summary
1.

All arguments and facts related to the pre-signing of the Decree of Divorce

signed on September 5, 2008 are irrelevant and were not issues before the trial court and
are not before this Court on appeal. 4
2.

The Decree of Divorce ordered (in part) that Father shall pay to Mother the

following:
a. Child Support (For Four minor children): $2,945 per month. R 0054
b. Alimony: $2,719 per month, commencing February 1, 2008, and continuing
for a period equal to the length of the marriage, or until the death of the
either party, the Petitioner's remarriage, or cohabitation with another
person, whichever occurs first. R 0055
3.

Father filed a Petition to Modify on February, 28, 2011. R 0065

4.

Mother filed an answer to said Petition to Modify on March 25, 2011. R

5.

Father failed to litigate said Petition to Modify until his attorney filed a

0071.

This appeal is from a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. Father seems to blur his
arguments attempting to argue that the Decree of Divorce should be set aside due to fraud.
However, Father never filed a Rule 60B Motion to set aside and thus, any argument
alluding to pre-Decree of Divorce is irrelevant and was not preserved for appeal.

4
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Request for Final Pre-trial on November 25, 2013. R 0076
6.

Mother objected to the request for final pre-trial as father had failed to file

any initial disclosures or financial documents supporting his claim to modify child
support and alimony and asked the court to dismiss his Petition to Modify pursuant to the
failure to prosecute. R O102
7.

Mother filed her initial disclosures on March 6, 2014. R 0089

8.

Father filed his incomplete initial disclosures on May 29, 2014. R 0104

9.

Mother's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was heard by the court

on June 27, 2014, in which the court denied the motion. R 0153
10.

At the hearing on June 27, 2014 the court ordered the parties to complete

discovery by August 28, 2014 and set the matter to be heard for pre-trial that same day. R
153
11.

Mother sent out several subpoenas to various companies that Father's

company did work with on August I l, 2014. R 0115-0218
12.

Mother, needing additional time for discovery, filed a Motion to Re-open

Discovery with the court on September 9, 2014. R 227-331
13.

The court held a hearing on September 22, 2014 and denied Mother's

request to re-open discovery. R 0446
14.

The court held a final pre-trial on August 21, 2015 setting out the terms for

preparing for trial. R 0565-0568
15.

Trial was held on October 23, 2015.

16.

At trial, Father made an oral motion asking the trial court to make any
8

orders nunc pro tune to the date of the Decree of Divorce. R 0627-0659
17.

Mother objected to said oral motion on October 27, 2015. R 0664-0666

18.

The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on

November 10, 2015. R 0674-0682.
19.

Mother was ordered to prepared the final order with the court. This was a

long and strenuous task as Father's attorney kept objecting to Mother's proposed orders.
However, the final Order Modifying Decree of Divorce was submitted and signed by the
court on May 23, 2016. R 820-836
20.

The trial court modified Father's child support and alimony obligation in its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
a. Father was to pay Child Support consistent with his imputed income of
$6,662.00 and Mother's income (at the time of trial) of $2,503. Child
support was ordered at $714.64 per month. R 0833
b. Child Support was backdated to the Decree of Divorce using father's
imputed income. The court also took Mother's current income and
backdated it to the Decree of Divorce noting though that this was not her
income at the time of the Decree. R 0678
c. Mother was awarded a judgement of child support arrears in the Amount of
$55,901.09. R 0833
d. The Child Support was modified four times going back to the Decree of
Divorce to account for the three children that had emancipated in May
2009, May 2010 and May 2013, respectively. R 0833-0834
9

e. Father was ordered to pay Mother alimony in the amount of $1,900 per
month from the Time the Decree of Divorce. R 0834
f. Mother was awarded alimony for 19 years which was the length of the
marriage. R 0680.
g. Mother was awarded a judgement for alimony in arrears of $152,689.90
through October 23, 2015. This amount reflected all alimony from
September 5, 2008, until the date of trial on October 25, 2015. R 083
21.

Father filed for appeal on June 21, 2016. R 837-839.

Disputed Facts

22.

Father uses paragraph 1-9 of his Statement of Facts to discuss history prior

to the Decree of Divorce which is irrelevant to the case at hand. Father chose to file a
Petition to Modify, not a Rule 60B Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce. Thus,
any facts and/or argument relating to prior to the Decree of Divorce being signed
(September 9, 2008) are irrelevant and should be excluded from consideration in the trial
court and this Court.
23.

Father is incorrect when he argues that there was no evidence of income

verification existing for either party in the court file when the Decree of Divorce was
entered.
a. Mother filed an Affidavit of Default on July 2, 2008 stating "the
Respondent's income is in dispute. The Respondent did not file taxes for
2006 and 2007. His I 099 for 2007 shows $219,246 per year or 18,271 per
10

month". R 0020-0027
b. Mother filed an Affidavit of Respondent's income on August 19, 2008
stating "the Respondent has recently been incarcerated in the Utah County
Jail. He has a felony pending. His l 099 for 2007 shows $219,246.00 per
year or $18,271.00 per month. R 0039-0040.
24.

Father was mailed a copy of the Decree of Divorce on July 31, 2008. R

0053-0060. This was over a month prior to the Decree of Divorce being signed by the
Judge on September 5, 2008. R 0053-0060. This Court should note that Father was not
incarcerated at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered by the court as he had bailed
himself out of Jail on July 28, 2008. R 110 I Petitioner's Exhibit 12.
25.

Father states that Trial was held on October 25, 2015, however, this is

incorrect as Trial was held on October 23, 2015. R 660-661. Mother does not dispute the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court.
26.

Father incorrectly argues that neither Father, Mother, nor any other witness

or expert provided evidence or testimony to the trial court regarding the father' ability to

earn. 5
27.

The Trial Court made several findings regarding the evidence presented

(and/or lack of evidence due to Father's own doing) that would support the imputation of
Father's income and/or his ability to earn. This evidence is as follows:

Father's argument leads one to believe that he is arguing that the Trial Court cannot make
findings that are against him if he so chooses and fails to provide evidence of his actual
income. This would lead parties to intentionally chose to not disclose as much information
as possible so that the Trial Court could not make an adverse finding against them.
5
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a. Testimony of Father.
b. Testimony of Mother.
C. Testimony of Jennifer Hutchings.

d. Testimony of Shane Hutchings.
e. Testimony of Tyler Anderson.

f. Testimony of Steal Anderson.
g. Joint federal tax return for 2004. Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 7.
h. Joint Tax Return for 2005. Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 8.
1.

Loren Anderson's Paystubs from Steelcoat. Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 11.

J. Accounts Payable to Steelcoat and Loren Anderson from Action Target in
the amount of$494,979.65 between May 28, 2013 -August 20, 2014.
Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 14.

k. September 15, 2015 Financial Declaration of Loren Anderson.
Respondent's Trial Exhibit 1.

I.

May 29, 2014 Financial Declaration of Loren Anderson. Respondent's
Trial Exhibit 2.

m. Loren Anderson's individual and business Tax Returns 2011. Respondent's
Trial Exhibit A.
n. Loren Anderson's individual Tax Return 2012. Respondent's Trial Exhibit
B.
o. Loren Anderson business Tax Return 2012. Respondent's Trial Exhibit G.

p. Loren Anderson's individual and business Tax Return 2013. Respondent's
12

Trial Exhibit C.
q. Loren Anderson's checks from his company DBA Steelcoat. Respondent
Trial Exhibit C.
r. Wells Fargo page showing Jennifer Hutchings (Father's current wife) is on
the bank account for Steelcoat. Respondent's Trial Exhibit C.
s. Invoices from Steelcoat. Respondent's Trial Exhibit 4.

t. W-2's of Jennifer Hutchings from Steelcoat. Respondent's Trial Exhibit 14.
28.

All the evidence above was deduced by the trial court finding that Father is

voluntarily underemployed and capable of making more money than he claims. The trial
court also found that Father's argument/testimony cannot be found credible. R 06740681
29.

Therefore, the trial court modified the Decree of Divorce as to Father's

child support obligation and alimony pursuant to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law made at trial.

SUM:1\-'IARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imputed Father's income at
$6,662.00 per month. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother
$1,900 per month in alimony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
child support consistent with the Utah Child Support Calculator and based on Father's
imputed income. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-3. The trial court correctly awarded attorney
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fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. Mother should be awarded her attorney
fees on appeal.
ARGUMENT

I.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when imputing father's income
to $6,662.00 per month.

This Court will reverse a ttial com1's imputation of income to a party if""(l) there
was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error; (2) the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; or (3) such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Rayner v. Rayner, 316 P. 3d 455 (Ut. App.2013), ~ 4 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Having ··considerable discretion/' the trial cow1's '·actions are entitled to
a presumption of validity." id. (citation omitted).
When considering the imputation argument, the trial court must enter ""findings of
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation." Utah Code Ann. §788-12-203(7)(a).
If the court determined that imputation is proper, the court must decide the proper amount
to impute by considering the factors outlined in Utah Code §788-l2-203(7)(b). A finding
of voluntary underemployment is no longer necessary in the imputation analysis. Reller v.
Argenziano, 360 P.3d 768 (Ut. App. 2015) at ~33. This Court has fu11her stated that

[fJindings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by \vhich the ultimate
conclusions on each factual issues was reached.'' Hall, 858 P.2d at l 02 l
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)~ accord Fish, 20 l O UT App
292, il 20, 242 P.3s 787. ·The trial court's decision to impute income may
nonetheless be affirmed if the failure to have made the missing findings can
be viewed as harmless error." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025. '"One method is to
show that the undisputed evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors
14

on \vhich findings are missing." Id. ( citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)~ see also Jfcmcil, 2000 UT App 3 78, ~21, 18 P.3d 509 (concluding
that specific findings on the statutory imputation factors were not necessary
when the evidence was not in dispute). ··Fu11hermore, even given
controve11cd evidence, we could affinn the trial court's decision to impute
income, absent outright expression of the statutorily mandated finding, if
the absent findings can be reasonably implied." Hall, 858 P.2d at l 025.
"Unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial
court actually considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a
finding to resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual
determination it made." Id.; see Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75,, 15, 984 P.2d
987 (determining that some the statutory factors required in the imputation
analysis were "necessarily implied'' by the evidence). '"Findings may not be
implied, however, when the ambiguity of the facts makes such an
assumption unreasonable.'' Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025. (citation an internal
quotation marks omitted). For example, "we will not imply any missing
finding where there is a matrix of possible factual findings and we cannot
ascertain the trial court's actual findings." Id. at 1025-26 (citation an
internal quotation marks omitted).
Father's primary contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly made
findings from the evidence presented (or lack thereof) by Father as to his income and
ability to earn. Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion in using the
parties' 2004 tax year as the benchmark for the trial court's calculation of Father's ability
to earn. Father's arguments are without merit as Father's failure to present adequate
evidence to support his claims and his evasive nature required the Court to make factual
and legal findings based upon the best evidence presented to the court.
a. The trial court correctly found Father's testimony to not be credible
regarding his ability to earn.

In Cecil v. Cecil, No. 20030937 (unpublished) (Ut. App. 2005), the Court of
Appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Husband was
voluntarily underemployed and imputing him to an income based upon evidence the
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Court found to be more credible. The court stated that"[ t]he trial court's decision on each
of these issues reveals no manifest injustice or inequity. Rather, the court's findings of
fact show that the trial court duly considered the evidence Appellant points to on appeal
but found other evidence more important or more credible." Id.
In that case, Husband argued that his income at trial as a stocker at Wal-Mart
should have been used as his income despite his previous employment at both a manager
and assistant manager. Father argued that he was not voluntarily underemployed because
his stress related health issues precluded him for working in management positions. The
trial court found that Father was voluntarily underemployed and imputed him to a wage
more commiserate with what the trial court believed he could earn based upon the
evidence presented. The Court of Appeals commented that
[t]he trial court's findings of fact show that the court was simply not
persuaded that these circumstances prevented Appellant from being
successful as an assistant manager at \.Val-Mart or that these circumstances
forced him to work only as a stocker. These determinations are well within
the sound discretion of the trial court since the trial court is in an
advantaged position to weigh the evidence, determine the persuasive value
of the evidence, and make determinations based on the evidence. see Willey
v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Ut. App. 1997).
Id.

This case is analogous to Cecil as Father contends that the trial court should have
used his current income based upon his representations of current earnings and his
apparent ability to earn based upon his criminal background which he argues prevents
him from having any meaningful income. The trial court found that Father's testimony
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and representations were not credible, therefore the trial court had to make independent
determinations as to Father's ability to earn. Id.
Father's argument on appeal is the same as Father's argument in Cecil. Likewise,
the trial court in this case found that certain evidence was more credible than other
evidence presented at trial. Mother presented evidence that Father did have ability to earn
an income similar to the amount he was able to earn during the marriage. This was
established by showing the Father was operating a business similar to that of the business
he had run during the marriage.
During the marriage, Father owned a business and "has worked in the past as a
floor installer". (R. at 0675). Father's new wife started a company, Steelcoat, in 2011
"with [father's] help". Id. Steelcoat participated in largely similar activities and services
as those Father provided through his business during the marriage. The trial court stated
that "Steelcoat does the same kind of work father was doing before he started living with
his new wife." Id. Father claimed that the business was owned and operated by his wife
and that he only works for the company. Id. This is despite the evidence received by the
trial court illustrating that Father is the primary owner and operator of the business.
The trial court made specific findings concluding that "[t]he Court finds Steelcoat
is marital property of father and his new wife but is controlled by him." R. at 0676.
( emphasis added). In coming to a determination, the court found the following:
1. He [Father] and his new wife represented his adjusted gross income (AGI) as
$2,000 per month working for Steelcoat, a shooting range installation company
which father and his new wife claim she started and owns. R. at 0675.
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2. The Company has receipts of several hundred thousand dollars per year before
expenses. R. at 0675.
3. Steelcoat does the same kind of work father was doing before he started living
with his new wife. R. at 0675.
4. Steelcoat serves Father's primary principle customer, Action Target. R. at 0675.
5. The new wife states she earns $30,000 per year from Steelcoat after paying other
employees. She has a full-time job at Maverick earning $12 per hour. R. at 0675.
6. Action Target switched from invoicing Father directly to Steelcoat in 2013. see
Petitioner's Exhibit 14.
7. Father's current wife was unable to identify Steelcoat's tax year but Father knew
exactly what it was. R. at 0675.
8. Father's current wife claimed she had spoken with Action Target's installation
director. but he later testified, denied talking to her and testified he only dealt with
father. R. at 0675.
9. Father's current wife claimed that she works three to four hours per day lining up
jobs and making reservations for Steelcoat. R. at 0675.
10. Father's current wife claimed she works with Father to bid projects and keeps
books. R. at 067 5.
11. Father was much more familiar with Steelcoat's operations and financial
information that his current wife. R. at 067 6.
12. He [Father] was much more familiar with Steelcoat's operations and financial
information than the new wife was. R. at 0676.
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13. He [Father] helped her [new wife] set up the company, which does the same thing
he was doing before the company was set up. R. at 0676.
14. Father is not allowed to have a checking account due to his criminal convictions
and he finances purchases on a credit card in his mother's name. R. at 0676.
15. Steelcoat pays $600 per month for Father's child support which is unreported on
his tax documents. R. at 067 6.
Father works only at the company full time and his functions consist of running the
company projects. (R. at 0675). Based on these findings the court found that Steelcoat is
marital property of father and his new wife but is controlled by him. The Court finds his
and his wife's testimony incredible.
In addition to the findings by the court, there is an email from Steelcoat's primary
customer, Action Target, that was admitted into evidence, that illustrates the payments
that were being made to Father directly from May 28, 2013 through October 26, 2013.
Action Target then started making payments immediately thereafter to Steelcoat starting
in November 29, 2013. The email states that all payments made to both Father and
Steelcoat from May 28, 2013 through August 20, 2014 totaled $494,979.65. See
Petitioner's Exhibit 14. Thus, the argument that father was not running or controlling
Steelcoat is disingenuous and not supported by the evidence.
Father also argued that his criminal history had prevented him from obtaining
employment comparable to the employment enjoyed during the marriage. (R. at 0943).
This is unsupported as Father operated Steelcoat with very little repercussion of his
criminal history. Shane Withers, Director of Installation and Project Management for
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Action Target, testified that subcontractors are not subject to background checks because
Action Target would have vetted them before then. (R. at 0981 ). Mr. Withers continues
and states that ''[b ]efore they even become a subcontractor we have - we have checked
out their credentials and got references and checked them out beforehand." Id. In
explaining what would disqualify a subcontractor or their business from doing work with
Action Target, Mr. Withers replied,
The main thing would be there's certain jobs where they couldn't get onto
say military bases, based off of their criminal records. Some of my current
installers that have criminal records don't allow them to go onto the
military bases, but for the most part if something's in the past we don't
really hold that against them.
If they- typically we don't really exclude anybody from working with us
unless they would have had something egregious in their past where we've
had fights or disagreements or whatever with them, or previous things with
them.
I guess - I mean, to answer your question, criminal past is usually not a doesn't- we don't preclude people from working for us because of a
criminal past or even drugs, as long as they are currently passing clean drug
tests, they're find working for us or being subcontractors for us.

R. at 0982.
Father stated the same in his testimony that his criminal background did not
preclude him from working for Action Target or other similar companies. R. at 0943.
Father also admits that he, and Steelcoat, can bid for other contracts outside of Action
Target. Id. There are overwhelming findings made by the Trial Court in coming to its
finding of imputing father income. It is obvious that the court did not abuse its discretion
when imputing father to $1,900 per month.
Based on the evidence the Trial court had at the time of the trial it could not find
the father credible and was forced to use best evidence in determining his ability to earn
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and imputation of income. A few of the findings the trial court made are as follows:
Father failed to provide a complete tax records. He also failed to introduce
a 2014 return for Steelcoat even though the filing date is overdue and the
finances are not complete. It is unrebutted father told his son about one
month before trial that if mother would stop pursuing him, it would be
easier and he would not have to hide things. By ''hide" he was referring to
unreported income because the son was asking him for help with hocked
dues. In fact, Father has a long time practice of dealing in cash and not
reporting the income or disclosing amounts to mother. Father deals in
frequently cash. He paid his son cash for a job and issued no tax forms.
During his marriage to mother, he generally had large accounts of cash with
him. After the divorce, on the less than frequent occasions when he paid
mother money before the ORS became involved he paid cash. His highest
reported AGI while married to mother was about $41,000. However, in
that same tax year, besides always having large amounts of of cash from his
business, he was able to pray travel expenses and team fees for his sons'
hockey, as well as for other's children. These sums amounted to at least
well over $15,000 per year, he was not only paying his but other children's
expenses to ensure there was a team. He was able to afford an illegal drug
habit and the Court has never found a meth dealer takes anything but cash.
He cannot have a checking account because of past forgery and thus deals
in cash when not using his mother's credit card. His crimes of moral
turpitude impeach his testimony under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Father's evasive demeanor on the stand regarding income and the
business did not inspire confidence in his truthfulness.
R. at 0676.
Based on these findings the court used its best evidence to determine Father's
ability to earn and correctly imputed him.
b. The Trial Court correctly used 2004 as a benchmark.

Father argues that the trial court erroneously ignored the parties' tax return that
was filed in 2005 stating the parties' gross income for tax purposes was $16,917. Father
supports his argument that 2005 should have been used by the trial court because this was
"three years before the father began to 'abuse drugs"'. Father~s Brief at 12, 12. Father
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fails to provide any reference to the record supporting a statement that Father had not
started his drug use. Father is asking this Court to believe Father's drug use began in
2008 when Father was charged with drug crimes. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.
The trial court's decision to use the 2004 benchmark was not incorrect or an abuse
of discretion as 2004 was the year that best reflected Father's ability to earn prior to the
parties' divorce. In 2004 the parties' federal tax return indicates that Father earned
$41,317 of adjusted gross income. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 7. The same return indicates
that the gross receipts for that year were $343,614 and there were costs of goods sold in
the amount of $269,268. Id. This left a gross profit of $74,346. Father failed to provide
any accounting for costs of goods sold for any year, including Steelcoat. In that same
year, Father deducted another $29,888 for expenses for business use of his home. Id.
Again, Father failed to provide any support for these expenses for this or any other year.
The parties' 2005 joint federal tax return shows that the parties had $16,917 in
adjusted gross income. see Plaintiffs exhibit 8. In that year, the total reported gross
receipts were $193,691 and a $146,067 in costs of goods sold. Id. This left a gross profit
of $47,624. After Father's additional deduction of $29,796 in additional personal
business expenses, they were left with their adjusted gross income of$ 16,917.
Father presented no evidence as to the significant drop in gross receipts from 2004
to 2006. This difference is significant as it dramatically decreased the parties reported
earning on their federal taxes upon which Father argues the trial court should have relied.
The only evidence as to when Father began his drug abuse is testimony from Mother
regarding their separation. During trial the following exchange occurred:
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Q. Prior to you guys getting a divorce in 2008 did you - were you aware of
the issues that Loren had?
A. I packed his bags and put them in the garage and told him to come and
get them and never come home in September of 2006.
[Question by Ms. Coil and objection by Ms. Blakelock]
Q. At the time leading up to that 2006 was there - were you able to
maintain the bills at that time as well?
A. Um, yeah.
Q. When you say yes, was Loren continually contributing to yourA. Yeah, he was still giving me money. It was less frequent and less willing
at the time he was not in his right mind set, I don't think. He was very
promiscuous, and I just didn't want him around anymore.
R. at 0996-0997.
When counsel asked Mother about "the issues Loren had", counsel was referring
to Father's issues with drug abuse. Based upon Mother's testimony, the trial court can
reasonably infer that Father's drug abuse, or "issues", began prior to the parties'
separation in September 2006. The trial court could also reasonably infer that Father's
drug abuse was the cause for Father's lack of earning potential in 2005.
In further support of the trial court's use of 2004 for benchmark for the imputation
of income, Father's gross receipts as reported in 2004 ($343,614) were substantially
similar to the gross receipts of payments made to Father and Steelcoat from May 28,
2013 through August 20, 2014 ($494,979.65). These two-time periods are the only two
periods of time the trial court had to compare Father's ability to earn prior to, and after
the divorce.

c. The trial court determination of imputed income was not an abuse of
discretion.

As indicated, the trial court was placed in a position of using the best evidence
before the court to obtain a reasonable amount of imputation of Father's income. As
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previously discussed, the trial court's use of the parties' 2004 tax records was reasonable.
In addition to this income, the trial court imputed Father to an additional sum of "$20,000
of unreported cash, again based on large hockey payments and his carrying large sums of
cash from his contractor jobs." R. at 0678. Father argues that there is no basis or evidence
supporting the trial courts finding.
The full extent of the monies earned and available to Father during the marriage
are only known by Father. Father was sole wage earner after the birth of the minor
children. R. at 0993-4. Mother testified that she was not privy to the income and
workings of the business R. at 995. During the marriage, Mother was responsible for
paying most of the bills. R. at 0994. Father would place money into an account that
Mother had access to pay the bills. Id. Mother also testified that Father had additional
monies to the amount provided to Mother to pay bills. R. at 0996. Mother testified that
Father "always carried cash. He always had cash on hand, always." Id.
The amount Father had on hand and access to was supported by the testimony
given by the parties' child, Tyler Anderson, and testimony of Father. As Father indicates,
at trial Tyler Anderson was twenty-three (23) years of age. He testified regarding his
experience working with Father, as follows:
Q. Can you tell the Court what the nature of that work was?
A. So it started off as carpet. We did - we installed carpet. I usually tore it
out, and you know, helped lay it out. Then we got to do coating (inaudible).
That was mainly at Wendover on counter tops and some floors.
Q. Did you observe how your dad would pay for you for these jobs?
A. Just cash. It's always been cash.
Q. Do you have knowledge or - of your dad carrying lots of cash
throughout kind of your childhood and up to working with him?
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A. Yes, for the most part there was - a lot of cash was involved. I never
seen a check.
Q. Then did you observe him paying other employees of or other people
working with you in the same manner?
A. Well, for the most part it was me and him. There was a few guys that did
tag along and it was cash.
R. at 0973-0974.

It was well supported by the evidence that Father (as a contractor) dealt heavily
with cash. Father paid his child in cash. There is no indication that the cash paid to Tyler
Anderson or others that performed work for Father was reported to the IRS. Such
business practices would lead the trial court to the reasonable conclusion that Father did
obtain earnings that were likely also unreported through his taxes.
Mother, Father, and their son, Tyler Anderson, testified that hockey was a sport
the children participated in and paid for by Father. Father provided the following
testimony:
Q. Isn't it true that you have some sons that play hockey?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn't it true that hockey's a pretty expensive sport?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn't it true that you were able to cover those costs of their hockey prior
to 2008?
A. Um, yeah, with some help.
Q. Isn't it true that you would even sometimes pay for other kids' hockey
tuition fees because their families couldn't afford it themselves, correct?
A. Yes, there were times.
Q. Isn't it true that your family prior to the divorce really lived a satisfying
life, correct?
A. I would say so.
R. at 0950-1.
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Mother provided testimony establishing the nature of the boy's hockey
participation in their youth.
Q. Okay, can you specifically talk about in 2006, right before you guys
separated, your marital expenses at that time. Did you have a mortgage?
A. Uh-huh, we had a mortgage. Our - two of our boys played ice hockey.
They both played on two travel teams. My older son swam a lot. I mean, he
was always in training. He never competed because he couldn't - he's not
competitive, but he - I mean, we spend a lot of time at the pool with him
and would go - when the boys were younger, generally they tried to keep
the younger kids when [they] had to travel weekend to tournaments
together so they were in groups, but as they hold a little older Tyler played
in a different group, and so Loren would take Tyler to tournaments and I
would take Steele.
Q. All those expenses prior to 2006 were being paid for by Loren?
A. Yes.
R. at 0997-8.
Tyler Anderson testified as to his participation in hockey and the circumstances
around it.
Q. Okay, can you tell the Court what kind of activities you would
participate in as a youth?
A. Hockey, for the most part, school, the normal things.
Q. With hockey, can you tell the Court a little bit about how much that
would cost?
A. Well, I was young and I really didn't know exactly. I think- because for
a house - house league it was cheaper. That was the local stuff. Maybe
2,000, and then travel was 7 - upwards of 7,000.
Q. Were you responsible to pay for that a youth or A. I was not.
Q. Did your parents pay for that?
A. Yep.
Q. When you would play hockey would- did you also travel a lot?
A. Yep, yeah, a lot.
Q. Would your family or parents come with you to watch?
A. Yes, sometimes both, but it was most often my dad, I think.
Q. Okay, and your dad would pay for all of that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Then also you would have like equipment that was involved?
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A. Yeah, yep, exactly.
Q. Do you - did you - did your parents always make sure that that was
available to you as well?
A. Yes, I didn't go without.
R. at 0972-3.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial com1 reasonably found that Father had
access to cash greater than the amount indicated on his federal tax returns. The amounts
needed to pay for hockey with two children is significant and supported by the testimony
of the parties. As Father primarily covered the costs of such expenses, he is the only one
that can provide any evidence of the actual amounts. Mother was unable to have access to
this infonnation and she still does not have that access. If Father is unwilling to be
forthright with the trial court and provide accurate testimony as to the amounts of these
expenses, the court is left to make findings based upon the best evidence presented to the
court.
d. Father's attack on the testimony of Steele Anderson is not relevant.

Father attacks the testimony of the parties' son, Steele Anderson, arguing that his
statement that Father "made mention that if my mom would stop doing whatever [she's]
doing it would be easier for him to not have to hide what he's doing." (R. at 0970). The
statement was regarding his request for assistance to pay hockey dues. Id. Father further
argues that Steele did not identify exactly when Father made this statement. This
argument seems to be that the statement was made sometime in the past and not
immediately before trial. Father uses faulty logic that because Steele is out of high
school, therefore he would not be a on a team for which dues would have to be paid.
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Father's argument is outside the scope and irrelevant to the argument regarding
Father's imputed income. Such a statement goes more to Father's credibility and
indication of bad faith. Father's logic and assumed facts from the record can also be
viewed in an alternative manner. A full review of the exchange in Steele's testimony
provides greater context. Steele testified as follows:
Q .... has there ever been a time when you've had a conversation with your
dad that has led you to believe that he's hiding money?
A. There were a couple incidents. The most recent was September. I - he
made a mention that if my mom would stop doing whatever [she's] doing it
would be easier for him to not have to hide what he's doing.
Q. Did he make that comment in relation to something personally you were
asking for?
A. Yes, ma' am, it was for some hockey dues to help with my hockey
season.
Q. Did he allude for you that he's be able to pay those fees if his mom just
would stop coming after him with money?
A. He said it would be easier, but thaf pretty much it. That it would be
easier if he didn't have the problem of my mother.

R. at 0969-0970.
The trial court could reasonably infer that Steele was speaking about the
September immediately preceding the October 2015 trial. It would stand to reason that if
it had been any time before that Steele would have included a year. Father's argument
also fails as Father's counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine Steele to clarify his
statement and declined. Id.
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II.

Alimony:
a. The trial court did not err in awarding mother alimonv in the amount
of $1900 per month.

Father's argument that the court abused its discretion by awarding mother $1,900
per month in alimony is flawed on its face. Alimony is governed by both statutory and
case law factors. As the Utah Supreme Court stated, "the purpose of alimony ... 'is to
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.'" Jones,

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d I075 (Ut. App. 1985) (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409
(Vt. App. 1977). Based upon this underlying purpose, the Utah Supreme Court

"articulated three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award:

' [ 1] the financial condition and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support."' Id.
(quoting English, 565 P.2d 411-12). In addition, Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(8)(a) provides:
"the court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
1.

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

11.

the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

111.

the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

1v.

the length of the marriage;

v.

whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children requiring

support;
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v1.

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the

payor spouse; and
v11.

whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the

payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage."
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)
Additionally, section 8(c) provides that "As a general rule, the court should look to
the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in
accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living
that existed at the time of trial." (emphasis added). This Court will uphold a trial court's
alimony determination on appeal "unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated." Brien/wit v. Brienholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Ut. App. 1995). Father has not
been able to show that the trial court's findings amount to a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion. Father's arguments on appeal only show that he does not like the ruling and
that he wants to continue to shirk his responsibility of supporting his children and
Mother.
The failure of the trial court to make findings on the first three of those factors
listed under Section 30-3-5(8) constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Jones, 700
P .2d I 072 (Utah 1985); Bell v. Bell, 810 P .2d 189 (Ut. App. 1991 ). To satisfy this burden,
a party seeking alimony must provide the court with a credible financial declaration and
financial documentation to demonstrate that the Jones factors support an award of
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alimony. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153 (Ut. App. 2003), 19, (explaining that
before awarding alimony," the trial court is required to make adequate factual findings
on all material issues, unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable
of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Utah R. Civ. P. lOl(d)(l) ("Attachments for motions and responses
regarding alimony shall include income verification and a financial declaration."). See
Dahl v. Dahl 345 P.3d 566 (Utah App. 2015). The trial court did make specific findings
to the financial need of Mother. This is evident in the fact that the trial court reduced her
reasonable and necessary expenses to what it found were not reasonable or necessary.
The trial court did allow for health insurance, a car payment and retirement. The trial
Court found that "She [Mother] included expenses that were reasonable, such as a car,
insurance and health insurance, even though she does not presently have them but would
have them if Father paid support." R. 0678. "Since neither party complied with Dahl to
the extent of documenting each expense, although Mother did better than Father on this
point, the Court has no choice but to rely to a certain extent on their uncorroborated
testimonies to establish expenses." R 0678. The court did not abuse its discretion in
making this finding.

b. The trial court did not err in assessing mother's needs based on actual
and anticipated expenses.
Father claims "that mother provided a financial declaration (Petitioner's exhibit 2)
containing claims for expenses that were not actual expenses and which were not support
by any evidence and which did not exist, but were still allowed as expenses by the trial
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court." See Father's Appellate Argument paragraph 2 page 29. Mother did provide
evidence and testimony that she would have an expense for health insurance, a car
payment and retirement if Father had not blatantly refused to fulfill his court ordered
obligation of child support and alimony. Father's argument is not well founded and the
trial court agreed. "She [mother] included expenses that were reasonable, such as a car,
insurance and health insurance, even though she does not presently have them but would
have them if father paid support" See R 0678.
In the case Woolums v. Woolums, 312 P.3d 939 (Utah App. 2013), a case
analogous to this case, this Court specifically stated that
Husband's argument that expenses must be current expenses that are
actually being incurred at the time of trial is foreclosed by Utah case law
addressing this exact issue. This court has disavowed the notion that
"standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone." Ho·we/1 v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct.App.1991). A party's current, actual
expenses "may be necessarily lower than needed to maintain an appropriate
standard of living for various reasons, including, possibly, lack of income."
The evidence and testimony at trial establishes that Mother and Father lived a
much higher standard of living during the marriage. During the marriage, they were able
to travel, pay for their children's expensive extracurricular activities, etc. (R 997). At the
time of trial, not only was Mother living well below the standard of living of the
marriage, but was not even able to afford basic reasonable and necessary expenses such
as health insurance, car payment and retirement. This was evident in Mother's testimony
as follows:
Q. Have there been things that you have had to go out- go without because
you can't afford it?
A. Absolutely. I was without a car for two years, because mine died.
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Q. Have you been able to get medical treatment?
A. Minimal.
Q. Have there been any medical conditions you've had that you haven't
been able to resolve because you don't have the money?
A. I um, was diagnosed 19 years ago with something called polycystic
ovary syndrome, and it causes, among other things, a sever hormonal
imbalance. So I have to be on testosterone and progesterone and estrogen
block, and Meformin to control my blood sugar.
Q. Do you have medical insurance right now?
A.No.
Q. So how do you Pay for those medications?
A. Well, some of it - the more important ones I get, and the ones I can do
without I do without.
Transcript Page 158-159.
Father's attorney uses the case Dahl v. Dahl, 345 P.3d 566 (Utah App. 2015)) as
stating that Mother failed to provide proof for each of her expenses and thus should be
precluded them from being included in her reasonable and necessary expenses. However,

Dahl does not override Woolums. Dahl states "Mother bore the burden of providing the
district court with sufficient evidence of each factor listed in the Alimony statute." Dahl
did not hold that Mother was to specifically provide evidence for her actual and current
expenses. Mother did provide testimony regarding a car payment as follows:
Q: You told the Court that you didn't have a car for a long time because
you couldn't afford it. Were you able to finally get a car?
A: I did get one. I got one Monday.
Q: What is that payment?
A: It's 305 (Transcript Page 162 Line 17-22)
This Court should find that this is sufficient evidence to satisfy the legal standard.
In addressing Father's objection, the trial court specifically made findings to this
issue stating that "Father has not provided documentary backup for his claimed expenses.
This is particularly noteworthy because father argued mother should not be allowed

33

expenses because her documentary back was incomplete under Dahl v. Dahl. In making
this argument, father ignored the identical deficiency in his documentation. The only
backup document he provided were expenses reflected in the bank records of Steelcoat
and thus were the company's expenses, not his. Wife provided more documentation than
he did." R 0677.
Justice Durham in Dahl made a dissenting opinion that also opines the situation at
hand in this case.

I also find that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to its
determination to deny permanent alimony. The court ruled that " alimony
may not be awarded without specific findings of the need of the recipient
spouse." I disagree with this conclusion of law. The controlling statute
mandates that courts " shall consider" seven enumerated " factors in
determining alimony,'' including" the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse." Utah Code§ 30-3-5(8)(a); accord Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1075 (Ut. App. 1985) (" financial conditions and needs" of the
recipient spouse " must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award"). Although courts certainly must consider the financial need of the
recipient spouse, among other mandatory factors, the absence of evidence
on any one factor does not require the court to deny an award of alimony.
The lack of evidence of need may certainly affect the court's alimony
determination, but it is not necessarily dispositive. Because need is a factor
relevant to a holistic alimony determination, rather than a required element,
I would hold that the district court erred when it ruled that the absence of
credible evidence of need required a complete denial of an alimony award
Dahl v. Dahl, 345 P.3d 566 (Utah App.2015) Dissenting opinion from
Justice Durham.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in findings that Mother's reasonable and
necessary expenses per month (at the time of trial) were $4,400 per month. The trial
court clearly scrutinized Mother's expenses as her financial declaration
stated she had $5,496.21 per month in expenses. Allowing Mother to have a
reasonable expense of Health Insurance, a car payment and small allotment for retirement
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is reasonable and Mother should not be denied such because she was unable to afford
such expenses at the time of trial due to Father's refusal to pay court ordered child
support and alimony.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother alimony
in the amount of $1,900 per month.
Father argues that even if the court was correct in its findings of mother's
reasonable and necessary need and its imputation of Father's income to $6,662.00 per
month, that it resulted in Mother having a net windfall each month. However, this is
flawed on its face. The parties were divorced on September 5, 2008. Father did not file
its Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce until March 7, 2011. At trial on October 23,
2015 the trial court heard an oral motion from Father to nunc pro tune its findings back to
the entry of the Decree of the Divorce. The trial court allowed for a post-trial brief to be
filed. The trial court found in its findings that it would grant Father's nunc pro tune
motion retroactively apply its findings and orders back to the entry of the Decree of
Divorce. The trial court apparently did this as a courtesy to Father and stated:
Father seeks in essence to set aside the income declared in the decree in
2008 by asking the Court for a nunc pro tune order modifying support to
the date of the decree. There has never been a motion to set aside the
decree's provisions under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in
the past six years. However, in order to reach an equitable resolution in this
case, and in light of the fact father was most certainly not making over
$200,000 per year at any time, but also taking into account the Court is
using inflationary adjustment to impute this current income, the Court will
select a middle ground and set the effective date of the income found herein
to the date of the divorce decree, September 5, 2008. The Court does this
even though the time limits under rule 60(b) have long expired. The Court
see no obligation to do this as father did nothing about the decree until just
before trial, and did not make consistent payment of any amount for three
years-and still has not after filing the petition to modify. The Court
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emphasizes it is taking into account the fact it is adjusting and reducing
father' imputed income for inflation now but applying that figure beginning
in 2008 rather than now. This approach benefits father but sanctions him
for his lack of diligence, good faith and failure to support his children and
former spouse notwithstanding his ability to do so.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting alimony at $1,900 per month.
Father argues that if you go through each minor emancipating that Mother is receiving a
net windfall. However, Mother, at the time of the Decree of Divorce, had an imputed
income of $1,015 per month6 Father is attempting to take Mother's current income (at the
time of trial of $2,503) and state that this was Mother's income nunc pro tune back to the
Decree of Divorce. This is wrong and would make a grave injustice for Mother.
Additionally, at the time of the Decree of Divorce Mother had an increased need as she
had four minor children compared to the one minor children she has today. For the court
to validate Father's argument, the court would then have to go back and make a finding
of Mother's actual income each year and her actual need each year post decree to ensure
that they were correct for calculating alimony. The trial court attempted to forgo such a
timely and costly analysis by making an equitable resolution. R 0679. Father cannot
show that there was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated and thus
this court must uphold the trial court's findings.

Mother was not working at the time of the Decree of Divorce but stipulated to be imputed
to be imputed to $1,015 per month.

6
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III.

The court did not abuse its discretion in setting father's child support
obligation in an amount based on his imputed income of $6,662.00 per
month.

This Court should refer to the above argument regarding Father's imputed income
as to why the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing Father's income to
$6,662.00 per month. Father received a benefit from the court's finding and, therefore,
cannot show that the court abused its discretion. Mother was, at the time of trial, making
an undisputed amount of $2,503.00. The trial court allowed for Father to pro nunc tune
the trial court's findings back to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. Because of this,
Mother's income at the time of trial was used to calculate the modified child support orders.
However, Mother's income was only $1,105 at the time of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce. Likewise, her expenses at the time of the Decree of Divorce were higher as she
had four minor children, rather than the one that she had at the time of trial. Thus, Father
cannot show, and this Court should not find, that the trial court abused its discretion when
Father received a benefit that washed away several thousand dollars of his arrears that he
owed to Mother.

IV.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother attorney
fees?

The trial court awarded attorney fees based off two different legal bases: 1) Utah
Code 30-3-3 ( l) states that in any action filed under Title 30 ... the court may order a party
to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. (2) Utah Code 78B-5-825
"in civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the

37

court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought
or asserted in good faith." Herein, the trial court awarded Mother attorney fees because
the trial court found that Father's hiding of income and failure to be forthcoming with
complete records allowed an award of attorney fees to Mother pursuant to Utah Code
§788-5-825. Furthermore, the court found that under Utah Code §30-3-3, Mother should
be awarded fees due to her inability to afford attorney fees and Father has the ability to pay
them.

a. Fees are proper under Utah Code 30-3-3:
"The district court has broad discretion to award attorney fees in a divorce decree
modification action, and we reverse such an award only if it is " seriously inequitable or
otherwise unjust." Young v. Young, 201 P. 3d 301 (Ut. App. 2009),

1 21.

''To allow

meaningful appellate review, however, the decision to award attorney fees must be
supported by detailed findings of fact." See Connell v. Connell, 836 P. 3d 233 (Ut. App.
2010), 127. "Fees awarded ... [for establishing a support order] must be based on the usual
factors of need, ability to pay, and reasonableness." See id.; see also Utah Code Ann.§ 303-3( 1) (Supp.2011 ). " The court specifically made some findings that "Since father has not
been paying adequate alimony or child support mother cannot afford attorney's fees but
father has the ability to pay them and thus mother is awarded fees under Utah Code 30-33." R 068 l.

b. Fees are proper under Utah Code 78B-5-825:
The trial court did not err when it awarded attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann.
§ 788-5-825. Section 788-5-825 states that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall award
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reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-5-825 (1) (emphasis added). "Whether the trial court properly
interpreted the legal prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under section [78B-5-825]
is a ·question of law' that we 'review ... for correctness."' Still Standing Stable, LLC v.
Allen, 2005 UT 46, 18, 122 P.3d 556 (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT
36, 1 17, 977 P.2d 120 I (holding that statutory interpretation presents a legal question)).
"According to the plain language of section 78-27-56 [renumbered as section
788-5-825], three requirements must be met before the court shall award attorney fees:
(1) the party must prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the opposing party must be without
merit, and (3) the claim must not be brought or asserted in good faith." Gallegos v.
Lloyd, 178 P.3d 922 (Ut. App. 2008), 19, certiorari denied 189 P.3d 1276 (citing
Hermes Assocs. v. Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah Ct.App.1991)).
Mother prevailed in showing that Father was and can make more than $11.00 per
hour. R 0680. The trial court found that Father's claim that he only could makes $2,000
per month was without merit and not credible. "In this case, the Court concludes
~I

although father has been able to get support and income modified from the decree, his
hiding of income and failure to be forthcoming with complete records make it
inequitable to award him attorney's fees." R 0680. The Court then found that "he
[Father] did not obtain nearly the results he desired-basically validation of his claim that
he only makes about $11.00 per hour. Those same factors would allow an award to
mother under the bad faith provision in title 78 of the Utah Code. Id. Therefore, this
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court should find that the trial court was correct in awarding attorney fees to Mother.

V.

MOTHER SHOULD BE AW ARD ED HER ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL
Mother should be awarded her attorney fees on appeal. "In divorce actions where

the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the receiving spouse [prevails] on the main
issues, we generally award fees on appeal." Stonehocker v. Stonhocker, 176 P.3d 476 (Ut.
App. 2008), 1 l l, (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mother has expended monies having to defend her position. Therefore, she should be
awarded her attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse it's in imputing income at $6,662. The evidence is
clear that Father was not being truthful about his income and can earn more than the
$11.00 per hour that he claimed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
Mother $1,900 per month in alimony for the length of the marriage. Though the court did
grant Father nunc pro tune motion and allowed for the court award to be backdated to the
entry of the Decree of Divorce, it did not discredit that Mother had a lower income and
much higher expenses at the time of the Decree of Divorce. Father essentially, "wants
his cake, and wants to eat it to." However, this would be to Mother's detriment and
overshadow the fact that the court was trying to be fair and equitable toward both parties.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding child support as imputing Father to
an income of $6662.00. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and was
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correct in awarding Mother attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code§ 30-3-3 and Utah
Code§ 78B-5-825. Mother should also be awarded her attorney fees on appeal.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court should affirm the judgment of the

district court.
Respectfully submitted this 21 st day of February, 2017.
COILLAW, LLC

L ke S
Attorneys.for Appellee
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30-3-3 Award of costs, attorney and witness fees ... Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate
Maintenance, or Title 788, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property
in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in
its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1 ), the court may order a party to provide money,
during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be
amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.
Amended

by

Chapter

3,
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2008

General

Session

78B-5-825 Attorney fees .... Award where action or defense in bad faith -·
Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under
Subsection (1 ), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court;
or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions
of Subsection ( 1).
Renumbered

and

Amended

by

Chapter
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3,

2008

General

Session

78B-12-203 Determination of gross income -- Imputed income.
( 1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from any
source, including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries,
wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages,
annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers' compensation benefits,
unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and
payments from 'nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40hour job. If and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job, the court may
consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child
support.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1 ), specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment
Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership
Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid,
SNAP benefits, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4)
(a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated
by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation
from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of
a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary
to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of
business income determined for tax purposes.
(5)
(a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide
year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from
at least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably
available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and
income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7)
(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount
1
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imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in
a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters
findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To
impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in
an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary
basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the condition
is not of a temporary nature:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal
the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills;
or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's
presence in the home.
(8)
( a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a
child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as
Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be
credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned
income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
Amended

by

Chapter

41,

47

2012

General

Session

30-3-5 Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care of parties and
children -- Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction -- Custody and
parent-time -- Determination of alimony -- Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
( 1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include
the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for
health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and
deductibles;
(b)
(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and
which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the
provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child
is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties'
separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services; and
(e) if either party owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an
acknowledgment by the court that the owner:
(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries;
(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries
after the divorce becomes final; and
(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contract, the
beneficiaries currently listed will receive any funds paid by the insurance company
under the terms of the policy or contract.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
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for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by
modification.
(5)
(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest
of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order
is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys'
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the
petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation
order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the
prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent-time.
(8)
(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the
payorspouse;and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or enabling the
payer spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award
alimony and the terms thereof.
(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that
substantially contributed to the breakup of the marriage relationship:
(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse;
(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the
other party or minor children;
(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or minor children to
reasonably fear life-threatening harm; or
(iv) substantially undermining the financial stability of the other party or the minor
children.
(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court
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records.
(e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However,
the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its
discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(g) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall
be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony.
If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(h) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring
each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(i)
(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
{iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may
not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
{A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living
expenses.
{B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds
that the payer's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
G) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of
time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and the payor party's rights are determined.
( 10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
Amended

by

Chapter

264,
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2013

General

Session

Rule 101. .Motion practice before court commissioners.
(a) Written motion required. An application to a court commissioner for an order must
be by motion which, unless made during a hearing, must be made in accordance with this
rule. A motion must be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief
sought and the grounds for the relief sought. Any evidence necessary to support the moving
party's position must be presented by way of one or more affidavits or declarations or other
admissible evidence. The moving party may also file a supporting memorandum.
(b) Time to file and serve. The moving party must file the motion and any supporting
papers with the clerk of the court and obtain a hearing date and time. The moving party
must serve the responding party with the motion and supporting papers, together with
notice of the hearing at least 28 days before the hearing. If service is more than 90 days
after the date of entry of the most recent appealable order, service may not be made through
counsel.
(c) Response. Any other party may file a response, consisting of any responsive
memorandum, affidavit(s) or declaration(s). The response must be filed and served on the
moving party at least 14 days before the hearing.
(d) Reply. The moving party may file a reply, consisting of any reply memorandum,
affidavit(s) or declaration(s). The reply must be filed and served on the responding party
at least 7 days before the hearing. The contents of the reply must be limited to rebuttal of
new matters raised in the response to the motion.
(e) Counter motion. Responding to a motion is not sufficient to grant relief to the
responding party. A responding party may request affinnative relief by way of a counter
motion. A counter motion need not be limited to the subject matter of the original motion.
All of the provisions of this rule apply to counter motions except that a counter motion
must be filed and served with the response. Any response to the counter motion must be
filed and served no later than the reply to the motion. Any reply to the response to the
counter motion must be filed and served at least 3 business days before the hearing. The
reply must be served in a manner that will cause the reply to be actually received by the
party responding to the counter motion (i.e. hand~delivery, fax or other electronic delivery
as allowed by rule or agreed by the parties) at least 3 business days before the hearing. A
separate notice of hearing on counter motions is not required.
(f) Necessary documentation. Motions and responses regarding temporary orders
concerning alimony, child support, division of debts, possession or disposition of assets,
or litigation expenses, must be accompanied by verified financial declarations with
documentary income verification attached as exhibits, unless financial declarations and
documentation are already in the court's file and remain current. Attachments for motions
and responses regarding child support and child custody must also include a child support
worksheet.
(g) No other papers. No moving or responding papers other than those specified in this
rule are pennitted.
(h) Exhibits; objection to failure to attach.
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(h)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (h)(3) of this rule, any documents such as tax
returns, bank statements, receipts, photographs, correspondence, calendars, medical
records, forms, or photographs must be supplied to the court as exhibits to one or more
affidavits (as appropriate) establishing the necessary foundational requirements. Copies
of court papers such as decrees, orders, minute entries, motions, or affidavits, already
in the court's case file, may not be filed as exhibits. Court papers from cases other than
that before the court, such as protective orders, prior divorce decrees, criminal orders,
information or dockets, and juvenile court orders (to the extent the law does not prohibit
their filing), may be submitted as exhibits.
(h)(2) If papers or exhibits referred to in a motion or necessary to support the moving
party's position are not served with the motion, the responding party may file and serve
an objection to the defect with the response. If papers or exhibits referred to in the
response or necessary to support the responding party's position are not served with the
response, the moving party may file and serve an objection to the defect with the reply.
The defect must be cured within 2 business days after notice of the defect or at least 3
business days before the hearing, whichever is earlier.
(h)(3) Voluminous exhibits which cannot conveniently be examined in court may not
be filed as exhibits, but the contents of such documents may be presented in the form
of a summary, chart or calculation under Rule I006 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Unless they have been previously supplied through discovery or otherwise and are
readily identifiable, copies of any such voluminous documents must be supplied to the
other parties at the time of the filing of the summary, chart or calculation. The originals
or duplicates of the documents must be available at the hearing for examination by the
parties and the commissioner. Collections of documents, such as bank statements,
checks, receipts, medical records, photographs, e-mails, calendars and journal entries,
that collectively exceed ten pages in length must be presented in summary form.
Individual documents with specific legal significance, such as tax returns, appraisals,
financial statements and reports prepared by an accountant, wills, trust documents,
contracts, or settlement agreements must be submitted in their entirety.
(i) Length. Initial and responding memoranda may not exceed IO pages of argument
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda may not exceed 5 pages of argument without
leave of the court. The total number of pages submitted to the court by each party may not
exceed 25 pages, including affidavits, attachments and summaries, but excluding financial
declarations and income verification. The court commissioner may permit the party to file
an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and showing of good cause.
G) Late filings; sanctions. If a party files or serves papers beyond the time required in this
rule, the court commissioner may hold or continue the hearing, reject the papers, impose
costs and attorney fees caused by the failure and by the continuance, and impose other
sanctions as appropriate.
(k) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause
may be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an
existing order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by affidavit or
other evidence sufficient to show cause to believe a party has violated a court order.
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(I) Hearings.
(l)( I) The court commissioner may not hold a hearing on a motion for temporary orders
before the deadline for an appearance by the respondent under Rule _ll.

(1)(2) Unless the court commissioner specifically requires otherwise, when the
statement of a person is set forth in an affidavit, declaration or other document accepted
by the commissioner, that person need not be present at the hearing. The statements of
any person not set forth in an affidavit, declaration or other acceptable document may
not be presented by proffer unless the person is present at the hearing and the
commissioner finds that fairness requires its admission.
(m) Motions to judge. The following motions must be to the judge to whom the case is
assigned: motion for alternative service; motion to waive 90-day waiting period; motion to
waive divorce education class; motion for leave to withdraw after a case has been certified
as ready for trial; and motions in limine. A court may provide that other motions be
considered by the judge.
(n) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court
commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A party may object to
the recommendation by filing an objection under Rule 108.
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